We present the first model of optimal voting under adversarial noise. From this viewpoint, voting rules are seen as error-correcting codes: their goal is to correct errors in the input rankings and recover a ranking that is close to the ground truth. We derive worst-case bounds on the relation between the average accuracy of the input votes, and the accuracy of the output ranking. Empirical results from real data show that our approach produces significantly more accurate rankings than alternative approaches.
rule returning the ground truth go to one as the number of votes goes to infinity. This allows them to design voting rules that uncover the ground truth in a wide range of noise models; however, they may potentially require an infinite amount of information.
Our approach. In this paper, we propose a fundamentally different approach to aggregating noisy votes. Instead of assuming probabilistic noise, we assume a known upper bound on the "total noise" in the input votes, and allow the input votes to be adversarial subject to the upper bound. We emphasize that in potential application domains there is no adversary that actively inserts errors into the votes; we choose an adversarial error model to be able to correct errors even in the worst case. This style of worst-case analysis -where the worst case is assumed to be generated by an adversary -is prevalent in many branches of computer science, e.g., in the analysis of online algorithms [10] , and in machine learning [23, 9] .
We wish to design voting rules that do well in this worst-case scenario. From this viewpoint, our approach is closely related to the extensive literature on error-correcting codes. One can think of the votes as a repetition code: each vote is a transmitted noisy version of a "message" (the ground truth). The task of the "decoder" is to correct adversarial noise and recover the ground truth, given an upper bound on the total error. The question is: how much total error can this "code" allow while still being able to recover the ground truth?
In more detail, let d be a distance metric on the space of rankings. As an example, the well-known Kendall tau (KT) distance between two rankings measures the number of pairs of alternatives on which the two rankings disagree. Suppose that we receive n votes over the set of alternatives {a, b, c, d}, for an even n, and we know that the average KT distance between the votes and the ground truth is at most 1/2. Can we always recover the ground truth? No: in the worst-case, exactly n/2 agents swap the two highest-ranked alternatives and the rest report the ground truth. In this case, we observe two distinct rankings (each n/2 times) that only disagree on the order of the top two alternatives. Both rankings have an average distance of 1/2 from the input votes, making it impossible to determine which of them is the ground truth.
Let us, therefore, cast a larger net. Inspired by list decoding of error-correcting codes (see, e.g., [20] ), our main research question is:
Fix a distance metric d. Suppose that we are given n noisy rankings, and that the average distance between these rankings and the ground truth is at most t. We wish to recover a ranking that is guaranteed to be at distance at most k from the ground truth. How small can k be, as a function of n and t?
Our results. We observe that for any metric d, one can always recover a ranking that is at distance at most 2t from the ground truth, i.e., k ≤ 2t. We also show that one can pick, in polynomial time, a ranking from the given noisy rankings that provides a weaker 3t upper bound. We complement the upper bounds by providing a lower bound of (roughly) k ≥ t/2 that holds for every distance metric. We also show that an extremely mild assumption on the distance metric improves the lower bound to (roughly) k ≥ t. In addition, we consider the four most popular distance metrics used in the social choice literature, and prove a tight lower bound of (roughly) k ≥ 2t for each metric. This lower bound is our main theoretical result; the construction makes unexpected use of Fermat's Polygonal Number Theorem.
The worst-case optimal voting rule in our framework is defined with respect to a known upper bound t on the average distance between the given rankings and the ground truth. However, we show that the voting rule which returns the ranking minimizing the total distance from the given rankings -which has strong theoretical support in the literature -serves as an approximation to our worst-case optimal rule, irrespective of the value of t. We leverage this observation to provide theoretical performance guarantees for our rule in cases where the error bound t given to the rule is an underestimate or overestimate of the tightest upper bound.
Finally, we test our worst-case optimal voting rules against many well-known voting rules, on two real-world datasets [27] , and show that the worst-case optimal rules exhibit superior performance as long as the given error bound t is a reasonable overestimate of the tightest upper bound.
Related work. Our work is related to the extensive literature on error-correcting codes that use permutations (see, e.g., [5] , and the references therein), but differs in one crucial aspect. In designing error-correcting codes, the focus is on two choices: i) the codewords, a subset of rankings which represent the "possible ground truths", and ii) the code, which converts every codeword into the message to be sent. These choices are optimized to achieve the best tradeoff between the number of errors corrected and the rate of the code (efficiency), while allowing unique identification of the ground truth. In contrast, our setting has fixed choices: i) every ranking is a possible ground truth, and ii) in coding theory terms, our setting constrains us to the repetition code. Both restrictions (inevitable in our setting) lead to significant inefficiencies, as well as the impossibility of unique identification of the ground truth (as illustrated in the introduction). Our research question is reminiscent of coding theory settings where a bound on adversarial noise is given, and a code is chosen with the bound on the noise as an input to maximize efficiency (see, e.g., [21] ).
List decoding (see, e.g., [20] ) relaxes classic error correction by guaranteeing that the number of possible messages does not exceed a small quota; then, the decoder simply lists all possible messages. The motivation is that one can simply scan the list and find the correct message, as all other messages on the list are likely to be gibberish. In the voting context, one cannot simply disregard some potential ground truths as nonsensical; we therefore select a ranking that is close to every possible ground truth.
Our model is also reminiscent of the distance rationalizability framework from the social choice literature [28] . In this framework, there is a fixed set of "consensus profiles" that admit an obvious output. Given a profile of votes, one finds the closest consensus profile (according to some metric), and returns the obvious output for that profile. Our model closely resembles the case where the consensus profiles are strongly unanimous, i.e., they consist of repetitions of a single ranking (which is also the ideal output). The key difference in our model is that instead of focusing solely on the closest ranking (strongly unanimous profile), we need to consider all rankings up to an average distance of t from the given profile -as they are all plausible ground truths -and return a single ranking that is at distance at most k from all such rankings.
A bit further afield, Procaccia et al. [31] study a probabilistic noisy voting setting, and quantify the robustness of voting rules to random errors. Their results focus on the probability that the outcome would change, under a random transposition of two adjacent alternatives in a single vote from a submitted profile, in the worst-case over profiles. Their work is different from ours in many ways, but perhaps most importantly, they are interested in how frequently common voting rules make mistakes, whereas we are interested in the guarantees of optimal voting rules that avoid mistakes.
Preliminaries
Let A be the set of alternatives, and |A| = m. Let L(A) be the set of rankings over A. A vote σ is a ranking in L(A), and a profile π ∈ L(A) n is a collection of n rankings. A voting rule f : L(A) n → L(A) maps every profile to a ranking. 1 We assume that there exists an underlying ground truth ranking σ * ∈ L(A) of the alternatives, and the votes are noisy estimates of σ * . We use a distance metric d over L(A) to measure errors; the error of a vote σ with respect to σ * is d(σ , σ * ), and the average error of a profile π with respect to σ
We consider four popular distance metrics over rankings in this paper.
• The Kendall tau (KT) distance, denoted d KT , measures the number of pairs of alternatives over which two rankings disagree.
Equivalently, it is also the minimum number of swaps of adjacent alternatives required to convert one ranking into another.
• The (Spearman's) Footrule (FR) distance, denoted d FR , measures the total displacement of all alternatives between two rankings, i.e., the sum of the absolute differences between their positions in two rankings.
• The Maximum Displacement (MD) distance, denoted d MD , measures the maximum of the displacements of all alternatives between two rankings.
• The Cayley (CY) distance, denoted d CY , measures the minimum number of swaps (not necessarily of adjacent alternatives) required to convert one ranking into another.
All four metrics described above are neutral: A distance metric is called neutral if the distance between two rankings is independent of the labels of the alternatives; in other words, choosing a relabeling of the alternatives and applying it to two rankings keeps the distance between them invariant.
Worst-case optimal rules
Suppose we are given a profile π of n noisy rankings that are estimates of an underlying true ranking σ * . In the absence of any additional information, any ranking could potentially be the true ranking. However, because essentially all crowdsourcing methods draw their power from the often-observed fact that individual opinions are accurate on average, we can plausibly assume that while some agents may make many mistakes, the average error is fairly small. An upper bound on the average error may be inferred by observing the collected votes, or from historical data (but see the next section for the case where this bound is inaccurate).
Formally, suppose we are guaranteed that the average distance between the votes in π and the ground truth σ * is at most t according to a metric d, i.e., d(π , σ * ) ≤ t. With this guarantee, the set of possible ground truths is given by the "ball" of radius t around π .
Note that we have σ * ∈ B d t (π ) given our assumption; hence, B d t (π ) = ∅. We wish to find a ranking that is as close to the ground truth as possible. Since our approach is worst case in nature, our goal is to find the ranking that minimizes the maximum distance from the possible ground truths in B 1 They are known as social welfare functions, which differ from social choice functions that choose a single winning alternative. 2 We use MiniMax d (S) to denote a single ranking. Ties among multiple minimizers can be broken arbitrarily; our results are independent of the tiebreaking scheme. 
Furthermore, the output ranking is guaranteed to be at distance at most k
) from the ground truth. We overload notation, and denote k Consider the Kendall tau distance with t = 1.5. The average distances of all 6 rankings from π are given below. Note that even with identical (scaled) error bounds, different distance metrics lead to different sets of possible ground truths as well as different optimal rankings. This demonstrates that the choice of the distance metric is important.
Upper bound
Given a distance metric d, a profile π , and that d(π , σ * ) ≤ t, we can bound k(t, π) using the diameter of the set of possible ground truths
for all distance metrics and t > 0. In words: 3 Scaling by the maximum distance is not a good way of comparing distance metrics; we do so for the sake of illustration only. 4 Multiple rankings indicate a tie that can be broken arbitrarily.
Theorem 1. Given n noisy rankings at an average distance of at most t from an unknown true ranking σ * according to a distance metric d, it is always possible to find a ranking at distance at most 2t from σ * according to d.
Importantly, the bound of Theorem 1 is independent of the number of votes n. Most statistical models of social choice restrict profiles in two ways: i) the average error should be low because the probability of generating high-error votes is typically low, and ii) the errors should be distributed almost evenly (in different directions from the ground truth), which is why aggregating the votes works well. These assumptions are mainly helpful when n is large, that is, performance may be poor for small n (see, e.g., [12] ). In contrast, our model restricts profiles only by making the first assumption (explicitly), allowing voting rules to perform well as long as the votes are accurate on average, independently of the number of votes n.
We also remark that Theorem 1 admits a simple proof, but the bound is nontrivial: while the average error of the profile is at most t (hence, the profile contains a ranking with error at most t), it is generally impossible to pinpoint a single ranking within the profile that has error at most 2t with respect to the ground truth in the worst-case (i.e., with respect to every possible ground truth in B t (π )). That said, it can be shown that there exists a ranking in the profile that always has distance at most 3t from the ground truth. Further, one can pick such a ranking in polynomial time, which stands in sharp contrast to the usual hardness of finding the optimal ranking (see the discussion on the computational complexity of our approach in Section 6).
Theorem 2.
Given n noisy rankings at an average distance of at most t from an unknown true ranking σ * according to a distance metric d, it is always possible to pick, in polynomial time, one of the n given rankings that has distance at most 3t from σ * according to d.
be the minimum distance any ranking has from the profile. Then,
) be the ranking in π which minimizes the distance from π among all rankings in π . An easy-to-verify folklore theorem says that d( σ , π) ≤ 2x. To see this, assume that ranking τ has the minimum distance from the profile (i.e., d(τ , π) = x). Now, the average distance of all rankings in π from π is
where the second transition uses the triangle inequality. Now, σ has the smallest distance from π among all rankings in π , which cannot be greater than the average distance
where the first transition uses the triangle inequality and the second transition uses the fact that d( σ , π) ≤ 2t and
Lower bounds
The upper bound of 2t (Theorem 1) is intuitively loose -we cannot expect it to be tight for every distance metric.
However, we can complement it with a lower bound of (roughly speaking) t/2 for all distance metrics. Formally, let d ↓ (r) denote the greatest feasible distance under distance metric d that is less than or equal to r. Next, we prove a lower bound 
t).
Consider profile π consisting of only a single instance of ranking σ . Then, σ ∈ B t (π ). Hence 
Recall that Theorem 1 shows that k(t) ≤ 2t. However, k(t) is the minimax distance under some profile, and hence must be a feasible distance under d. Thus, Theorem 1 actually implies a possibly better upper bound of d ↓ (2t). Together with Theorem 3, this implies
Next, we show that imposing a mild assumption on the distance metric allows us to improve the lower bound by a factor of 2, thus reducing the gap between the lower and upper bounds.
Theorem 4. For a neutral distance metric d, k(t) ≥ d ↓ (t).
Proof. For a ranking σ ∈ L(A) and r ≥ 0, let B r (σ ) denote the set of rankings at distance at most r from σ . Neutrality of 
The bound of Theorem 4 holds for all n, m > 0 and all t ∈ [0, D], where D is the maximum possible distance under d. It can be checked easily that the bound is tight given the neutrality assumption, which is an extremely mild -and in fact, a highly desirable -assumption for distance metrics over rankings. 
Theorem 4 improves the bounds on
The impossibility result of Theorem 5 is weaker for odd values of n (in particular, covering more values of t requires larger n), which is reminiscent of the fact that repetition (error-correcting) codes achieve greater efficiency with an odd number of repetitions; this is not merely a coincidence. Indeed, an extra repetition allows differentiating between tied possibilities for the ground truth; likewise, an extra vote in the profile prevents us from constructing a symmetric profile that admits a diverse set of possible ground truths.
Proof of Theorem 5. We denote {1, . . . , r} by [r] in this proof. We use σ (a) to denote the rank (position) of alternative a in ranking σ . First, we prove the case of even n for all four distance metrics. We later provide a generic argument to prove the case of large odd n. First, we need a simple observation. 
Proof. Note that
The Kendall tau distance: Let d be the Kendall tau distance; thus, D = m 2 and α = 2. Let n be even. For a ranking τ ∈ L(A), let τ rev be its reverse.
, and fix a ranking σ ∈ L(A). Every ranking must agree with exactly one of σ and σ rev on a given pair of alternatives.
. Consider the profile π consisting of n/2 instances of σ and n/2 instances of σ rev . Then, the average distance of every ranking from rankings in π 
Note that both σ and σ are extensions of P A . Once again, take the profile π consisting of n/2 instances of σ and n/2 instances of σ . It is easy to check that a ranking disagrees with exactly one of σ and σ on every pair of alternatives that belong to the same group in {A 1 ,
Clearly an equality is achieved in Equation (1) if and only if ρ is an extension of P A . Thus, every extension of P A has an average distance of 2t /2 ≤ t from π . Every ranking ρ that is not an extension of P A achieves a strict inequality in Equation (1); thus, d(ρ, π) ≥ ( 2t + 1)/2 > t. Hence, B t (π ) is the set of extensions of P A .
Given a ranking ρ ∈ L(A), consider the ranking in B t (π ) that reverses the partial orders over A 1 , A 2 , and A 3 induced by ρ. The distance of this ranking from ρ would be at least
We now proceed to prove the case of an even number of agents for the other three distance metrics. First, if M is the minimum distance between two distinct rankings under a distance metric d and t < M/2, then we have d ↓ (2t) = 0, which is a trivial lower bound. Hence, we assume t ≥ M/2.
The proof is along the same lines as the proof for the Kendall tau distance, but uses a few additional clever ideas. It is known that the maximum footrule distance between two rankings over m alternatives is D = m 2 /2 , and is achieved by two rankings that are reverse of each other [17] . Hence, we have α = 2; thus, we wish to find T ∈ (m 2 ) for which the claim will hold. Formally writing the distance between a ranking and its reverse, we get
Observation 2. The footrule distance between two rankings is always an even integer. 
It is easy to check that
Let us partition the set of alternatives A into {A i } i∈ [5] such that
and let 
Summing all the inequalities, we get
where the second transition follows from Equation (2) , and the third transition follows from Equation (3).
First, we show that ρ ∈ B t (π ) only if equality in Equation (5) holds. To see why, note that the footrule distance is always even and r = d
Hence, the average distance of ρ from votes in π would be greater than t.
On the contrary, if equality is indeed achieved in Equation (5), then the average distance of ρ from votes in π is r/2 ≤ t. Hence, we have established that B t (π ) is the set of rankings ρ for which equality is achieved in Equation (5) .
For ρ to achieve equality in Equation (5), it must achieve equality in Equation (4) We claim that the set of rankings satisfying these conditions are characterized as follows. Note that σ , σ ∈ B t (π ) and d FR (σ , σ ) = r (this distance is given by the summation in Equation (5)). Hence, D(B t (π )) ≥ r. Now, we prove that its minimax distance is at least r as well. Take a ranking ρ ∈ L(A). We need to show that there
ρ(a
m i i ), ρ(a m i +1 i ) = σ (a m i i ), σ (a m i +1 i ) .exists some τ ∈ B t (π ) such that d FR (ρ, τ ) ≥ r.
Consider alternatives a j i
and a
)} in order to belong to B t (π ). This allows two possible ways for placing the pair of alternatives. Let τ pick the optimal positions that maximize 
which we will now show to be at least r. 
where the first transition holds because the maximum of two terms is at least as much as their average, and the second transition uses the triangle inequality on appropriately paired terms. Now, we have
where the third transition holds due to Equation (2), and the fourth transition holds due to Equation (3 
. a m ).
Let profile π consist of n/2 instances of σ and σ each. We claim that B t (π ) has the following structure, which is very similar to the ball for the footrule distance.
and ρ(a i ) = i for i > 2 2t .
First, we observe the following simple fact: If rankings τ and ρ mismatch (i.e., place different alternatives) in r different positions, then d CY (τ , ρ) ≥ r/2. Indeed, consider the number of swaps required to convert τ into ρ. Since each swap can make τ and ρ consistent in at most two more positions, it would take at least r/2 swaps to convert τ into ρ, i.e.,
Now, note that σ and σ mismatch in each of first 2 2t positions. Hence, every ranking ρ ∈ L(A) must mismatch with at least one of σ and σ in each of first 2 2t positions. Together with the previous observation, this implies
Every ranking ρ that achieves equality in Equation (8) is clearly in B t (π ) because its average distance from the votes in π is 2t /2 ≤ t. Further, every ranking ρ that achieves a strict inequality in Equation (8) 
Now, any ranking ρ satisfying equality in Equation (8) must be consistent with exactly one of σ and σ in each of first 2 2t positions, and with both σ and σ in the later positions. The former condition implies that for every i ∈ 2t , ρ must place the pair of alternatives (a i , a 2 2t +1−i ) in positions i and 2 2t + 1 − i, either according to σ or according to σ . This confirms our claim that B t (π ) is given by Equation (7).
We now show that k(B t (π )) ≥ 2t . Take a ranking ρ ∈ L(A). We construct a ranking τ ∈ B t (π ) such that τ mismatches with ρ in each of first 2 2t positions. Together with our observation that the Cayley distance is at least half of the number of positional mismatches, this would imply that the minimax distance of B t (π ) is at least 2t , as required.
We construct τ by choosing the placement of the pair of alternatives (a i , a 2 2t +1−i ), independently for each i ∈ 2t , in a way that τ mismatches with ρ in positions i and 2 2t + 1 − i both. Let I(X) denote the indicator variable that is 1 if statement X holds, and 0 otherwise. Let r = I (ρ(a i ) = i) + I ρ(a 2 2t +1−i ) = 2 2t + 1 − i . Consider the following three cases.
Without loss of generality, assume ρ( The maximum displacement distance: Finally, let d MD denote the maximum displacement distance. Note that it can be at most D = m − 1; hence, it also has α = 1. However, this distance metric requires an entirely different technique than the ones used for previous distances. For example, taking any two rankings at maximum distance from each other does not work. We prove this result for t ≤ m/4. Once again, note that d
Consider rankings σ and σ defined as follows.
where a rest is shorthand for a 2 2t +1 . . . a m . Note that the blocks of alternatives a 1 through a 2t and a 2t +1 through a 2 2t are shifted to each other's positions in the two rankings. Thus, each of a 1 through a 2 2t have a displacement of exactly 2t between the two rankings. Thus,
Consider the profile π consisting of n/2 instances of σ and σ each. Clearly, σ and σ have an average distance of 2t /2 ≤ t from rankings in π . Hence, {σ , σ } ∈ B t (π ). Surprisingly, in this case we can show that the minimax distance of B t (π ) without any additional information regarding the structure of B t (π ).
Take a ranking ρ ∈ L(A). The alternative placed first in ρ must be ranked at a position 2t or below in at least one of σ and σ . Hence, max(d MD (ρ, σ ), d MD (ρ, σ ) ) ≥ 2t . Thus, there exists a ranking in B t (π ) at distance at least 2t from ρ, i.e., the minimax distance of B t (π ) is at least 2t , as desired.
This completes the proof of the special case of even n for all four distance metrics. Now, consider the case of odd n.
Odd n: To extend the proof to odd values of n, we simply add one more instance of σ than σ . The key insight is that with large n, the distance from the additional vote would have little effect on the average distance of a ranking from the profile.
Thus, B t (π ) would be preserved, and the proof would follow.
Formally, let L ≥ 2 and t ∈ (1/L, 1 − 1/L). For the case of even n, the proofs for all four distance metrics proceeded as follows: Given the feasible distance r = d ↓ (2t), we constructed two rankings σ and σ at distance r from each other such that B t (π ) is the set of rankings at minimal total distance from the two rankings, i.e.,
Let n ≥ 3 be odd. Consider the profile π that has (n − 1)/2 instances of σ and σ each, and an additional instance of an arbitrary ranking. In our generic proof for all four distance metrics, we obtain conditions under which
where π is obtained by removing the arbitrary ranking from π (and hence has an even number of votes). We already 
For rankings with an error greater than r to be outside B t (π ), we must have
Combining the inequalities, we obtain that
Choose
where the last equality holds because we showed (2D − 2t)/(n − 1) < {2t}.
In all three distance metrics considered thus far, we had 2t = d ↓ (2t). Let r = 2t . We show that r = 2t satisfies Equation (9) , thus yielding B t (π ) with minimax distance at least r = d ↓ (2t), as required. Note that
is satisfied by definition from Equation (9) . We also have
Next, consider the footrule distance. If 2t is even (i.e., if 2t = d ↓ (2t)), then the above proof works because r = 2t is a feasible distance. If 2t is odd, then we must choose r = 2t − 1. However, we have an advantage: since the footrule distance is always even, every ranking ρ with d(ρ, σ )
Note that r = 2t −1 clearly satisfies the first inequality in Equation (10) . For the second inequality, note that r decreased by 1 compared to earlier but 1 −2D/(n −1) increased to 2 −2D/(n −1) instead. Hence, the second inequality is still satisfied, and we get B t (π ) with minimax distance at least r = 2t − 1 = d ↓ (2t), as required. 2 
Approximations for unknown average error
In the previous sections we derived the optimal rules when the upper bound t on the average error is given to us. In practice, the given bound may be inaccurate. We know that using an estimate t that is still an upper bound ( t ≥ t) yields a ranking at distance at most 2 t from the ground truth in the worst case. What happens if it turns out that t < t? We show that the output ranking is still at distance at most 4t from the ground truth in the worst case. π) ) from σ * . This is true because the minisum ranking and the true ranking are both in B t (π ), and Lemma 1 shows that its diameter is at most min(2t, 2k(t, π)).
Returning to the theorem, if we provide an underestimate t of the true worst-case average error t, then using Lemma 1,
By the triangle inequality, d MiniMax(B t (π )), σ * ≤ 4t.
Experimental results
We compare our worst-case optimal voting rules OPT d against a plethora of voting rules used in the literature: plurality, Borda count, veto, the Kemeny rule, single transferable vote (STV), Copeland's rule, Bucklin's rule, the maximin rule, Slater's rule, Tideman's rule, and the modal ranking rule (for definitions see, e.g., [13] ). Our performance measure is the distance of the output ranking from the actual ground truth. In contrast, for a given d, OPT d is designed to optimize the worst-case distance to any possible ground truth. Hence, crucially, OPT d is not guaranteed to outperform other rules in our experiments. We use two real-world datasets containing ranked preferences in domains where ground truth rankings exist. Mao, Procaccia, and Chen [27] collected these datasets -dots and puzzle -via Amazon Mechanical Turk. For dataset dots (resp., puzzle), human workers were asked to rank four images that contain a different number of dots (resp., different states of an 8-Puzzle) according to the number of dots (resp., the distances of the states from the goal state). Each dataset has four different noise levels (i.e., levels of task difficulty), represented using a single noise parameter: for dots (resp., puzzle), higher noise corresponds to ranking images with a smaller difference between their number of dots (resp., ranking states that are all farther away from the goal state). Each dataset has 40 profiles with approximately 20 votes each, for each of the 4 noise levels. Points in our graphs are averaged over the 40 profiles in a single noise level of a dataset.
First, as a sanity check, we verified ( Fig. 1 ) that the noise parameter in the datasets positively correlates with our notion of noise -the average error in the profile, denoted t * (averaged over all profiles in a noise level). Strikingly, the results from the two datasets are almost identical! Next, we compare OPT d and MiniSum d against the voting rules listed above, with distance d as the measure of error.
We use the average error in a profile as the bound t given to OPT d , i.e., we compute OPT d (t * , π) on profile π where t * = d(π , σ * ). While this is somewhat optimistic, note that t * may not be the (optimal) value of t that achieves the lowest error. Also, the experiments below show that a reasonable estimate of t * also suffices. 5 Minisum rules such as the Kemeny rule are also compelling because they often satisfy attractive social choice axioms. However, it is unclear whether such axioms contribute to the overall goal of effectively recovering the ground truth. Comments on the empirical results. It is genuinely surprising that on real-world datasets, OPT d (a rule designed to work well in the worst-case) provides a significantly superior average-case performance compared to most prominent voting rules by utilizing minimal additional information -an approximate upper bound on the average error in the input votes. The inferior performance of methods based on probabilistic models of error is also thought provoking. After all, these models assume independent errors in the input votes, which is a plausible assumption in crowdsourcing settings. But such probabilistic models typically assume a specific structure on the distribution of the noise, e.g., the exponential distribution in Mallows' model [26] , and it is almost impossible that noise in practice would follow this exact structure. In contrast, our approach only requires a loose upper bound on the average error in the input votes. In crowdsourcing settings where the noise is highly unpredictable, it can be argued that the principal may not be able to judge the exact distribution of errors, but may be able to provide an approximate bound on the average error.
Discussion
Uniformly accurate votes. Motivated by crowdsourcing settings, we considered the case where the average error in the input votes is guaranteed to be low. Instead, suppose we know that every vote in the input profile π is at distance at most t from the ground truth σ * , i.e., max σ ∈π d(σ , σ * ) ≤ t. If t is small, this is a stronger assumption because it means that there are no outliers, which is implausible in crowdsourcing settings but plausible if the input votes are expert opinions. In this setting, it is immediate that any vote in the given profile is at distance at most d ↓ (t) from the ground truth. Moreover, the proof of Theorem 4 goes through, so this bound is tight in the worst case; however, returning a ranking from the profile is not optimal for every profile.
Randomization. We did not consider randomized rules, which may return a distribution over rankings. If we take the error of a randomized rule to be the expected distance of the returned ranking from the ground truth, it is easy to obtain an upper bound of t. Again, the proof of Theorem 4 can be extended to yield an almost matching lower bound of d ↓ (t). While randomized rules provide better guarantees, they are often impractical: low error is only guaranteed when rankings are repeatedly selected from the output distribution of the randomized rule on the same profile; however, most social choice settings see only a single outcome realized.
6
Complexity. A potential drawback of the proposed approach is computational complexity. For example, consider the Kendall tau distance. When t is small enough, only the Kemeny ranking would be a possible ground truth, and OPT d KT or any finite approximation thereof must return the Kemeny ranking, if it is unique. The N P-hardness of computing the Kemeny ranking [6] therefore suggests that computing or approximating OPT d KT is N P-hard.
One way to circumvent this computational obstacle is picking a ranking from the given profile, which provides a weaker bound of 3t instead of 2t on the distance from the unknown ground truth (see Theorem 2) . However, in practice the optimal ranking can also be computed using various fixed-parameter tractable algorithms, integer programming solutions, and other heuristics, which are known to provide good performance for these types of computational problems (see, e.g., [8, 7] ). More importantly, the crowdsourcing settings that motivate our work inherently restrict the number of alternatives to a relatively small constant: a human would find it difficult to effectively rank more than, say, 10 alternatives. With a constant number of alternatives, we can simply enumerate all possible rankings in polynomial time, making each and every computational problem considered in this paper tractable. In fact, this is what we did in our experiments. Therefore, we do not view computational complexity as an insurmountable obstacle. error. In this section we present additional experiments in an essentially identical setting but using the other three distance metrics considered in this paper as the measure of error. These experiments affirm that our proposed rules are superior to other voting rules independent of the error measure chosen. Figs. A.3, A.4, and A.5 show the experiments for the footrule distance, the Cayley distance, and the maximum displacement distance, respectively.
